Harry Jaffa opens A New Birth of Freedom with a review of the election of 1800. That election was, like its predecessor in 1796, one of the most contested and partisan in American history. Unlike its predecessor, the 1800 contest resulted in power changing hands for the first time under the Constitution. The electorate that was prepared to allow John Adams to continue the Washington presidency for four more years decided in 1800 to throw Mr. Adams and all his minions out in favor of a new administration under Thomas Jefferson.
Jaffa points out that throughout human history, when one group of partisans takes power from another, the losers have suffered imprisonment, forced exile, confiscation, or execution. The losing faction in Rome or Byzantium, in the English Civil War, in the French Revolution and the Russian, and in countless other political fights had one or more of those fates visited upon them. Even in the less bloody American Revolution, many American Tories fled to Canada or to Britain and did not return. Yet, after the election of Thomas Jefferson, the losers returned to their law practices, printing presses, and businesses to continue the same partisan activity that had led their opponents to victory at the polls in 1800 .
Jaffa tells us that this was the first time in human history that such a thing had happened. He contrasts this world-historical event — the peaceful transfer of power – to the storm that broke when Lincoln won the election of 1860. Before Lincoln took office, seven states had declared their secession from the Union, their “de-ratification” of the Constitution. The “Great Secession Winter” witnessed the most dramatic transition of presidential power in American history. Six of the seceding states had formed the Confederate States of America in February 1861. Even before that, partisans of the rebel government had been seizing federal property, including military installations, arms, and port facilities while the Buchanan administration looked on. Buchanan had developed a detailed rationale to explain that while the states had no right to secede, the federal government lacked the power to prevent them if they tried. When Lincoln took the oath of office, a rival government was operating within the borders of the United States without interference by the departing administration.
The transition from the Lincoln presidency to the McClellan administration, had it taken place, might have been nearly as dramatic. In the summer of 1864, Lincoln believed he was going to lose the November election. His Democratic opponent, George McClellan, wanted to restore “the Constitution as it is and the Union as it was”. The Constitution prior to the Thirteenth Amendment permitted each state to make its own decision about the legality of chattel slavery within its borders. The Union had been built on a series of compromises that had kept the South’s “peculiar institution” in place in fifteen states. During the 1860-61 transition, Lincoln had rejected a compromise that would have extended the Missouri Compromise line to the Pacific Ocean. The practical effect of the compromise would have been to protect slavery south of that line. McClellan’s proposal was to end the war and reunite on a basis that would implement the failed Compromise of 1861 as the Compromise of 1865.
When General Sherman captured Atlanta at the end of August 1864, Lincoln’s election prospects brightened. But had he lost, he was prepared to act aggressively to make it virtually impossible for his successor to reverse the Emancipation Proclamation and stop the momentum then building toward a constitutional amendment that would abolish slavery. He would be defying the will of the voters, true, but in the cause of the paramount moral issue of his day.
Something like the reverse of that situation occurred after the 1932 election. Hoover is known as a “do nothing” president, but there are historians and economists who think his problem was that he was a “do something, anything” president. Calvin Coolidge said that Hoover, his Secretary of Commerce, had advice for him every day of his presidency, “all of it bad”. When a sharp economic downturn began in 1930, Hoover was ready with a prescription of high tariffs, increased taxes, and jawboning to keep wages high. The resulting economic contraction caused a massive rejection by the electorate at their next opportunity. The man who won 40 of 48 states in 1928 carried six states in 1932. But Hoover remained a man of action during the transition. As a banking panic began to spread in early 1933, he saw an opportunity to implement deposit insurance, a long-standing goal of progressive politicians in both parties. The problem was that Franklin Roosevelt was opposed to deposit insurance. He did not like giving assurances to bank managers that they had no need to worry about the safety of their depositors’ money. FDR avoided Hoover’s snares, although deposit insurance was de facto adopted in March 1933 and fully in place by June 1933 when Roosevelt, once in office, was outflanked by his own party.
The 2016-17 interregnum has been one of the most dramatic in my lifetime. We had barely adjusted to the idea that a candidate who received one percent of the vote could demand a recount when we learned that the CIA had issued a press release outlining Russian activity during the 2016 election. The President who assured us before the election that the decentralized nature of our electoral processes immunized us against foreign hacking decided after the election to impose sanctions on Russia as payback for their role in arranging for the publication of stolen Democratic National Committee emails. Reports of the impact of fake news damaging to Mrs. Clinton were followed by the leak by an unidentified agency of 36 pages of salacious but unsourced and unverified information about the private life of Mr. Trump and the alleged nefarious activities of his aides.
The drama of earlier transitions derived from events of great historical importance then unfolding. What is the substance driving the drama we witnessed during the interregnum of 2016-2017? Like 1800, we will have a peaceful transition of power after a bitterly contested election. The potential for exile or expropriation of the losers exists only in the imagination. Unlike 1860 or 1864 the survival of the republic is not hanging in the balance. The economy is not in crisis as it was in 1932-33 (or in 2008-09, but in that case the Bush administration’s bailouts were done in coordination with the incoming administration). Many people are afflicted with a generalized sense of unease and distemper and there seems to be a widespread feeling that things are bad because they could be better, but the underlying social and political realities do not justify the transition melodrama now ending, possibly to be replaced by melodrama of a different kind.
When the southern states were faced with the reality of Abraham Lincoln’s election, the impulse to secede was tempered by voices that counseled caution. Alexander Stephens, soon to be the vice-president of the Confederacy, argued to the Georgia Convention in January 1861 that the South’s best course was to stay in the Union. The Democrats had a majority in the Senate. Lincoln would need southern votes to take any action, even to confirm his cabinet. The door would be opened for compromise. Leaving would give the Republicans a free hand.
It was good advice, drowned out by the pounding of hot blood in southern ears as they absorbed the insult that the nation had elected a man who had the bad taste to state plainly that slavery was evil. Opinions hardened, tempers flared and in the end a potent emotional reaction overcame prudence.
May I suggest, respectfully, that the reaction to the election of Donald Trump has some of these same characteristics, that the emotions of the moment are overcoming the better angels of our nature that Abraham Lincoln invoked in his first inaugural address? May I go further and suggest that too much energy has been devoted in recent years to silencing critics, to suppressing honest debate, and now to boycotting the side that had the gall to win a round? Oliver Wendell Holmes said that a constitution is made for people of fundamentally differing views. The corollary was stated by Abraham Lincoln in his July 4, 1861 address to Congress: “when ballots have fairly and constitutionally decided . . . there can be no successful appeal except to ballots themselves, at succeeding elections.”